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Mixed-Motive Cases in
Employment Discrimination Law
Revisited: A Brief Updated View
of the Swamp
by Robert Belton*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1973 the Supreme Court enunciated an analytical framework in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green1 with the purpose of providing
plaintiffs in statutory employment discrimination cases 2 a full and fair

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. University of Connecticut (B.A., 1961);
Boston University (J.D., 1965). The author expresses his appreciation to Carrie B. Rosen,
Vanderbilt Law School, Class of 2000, for her research assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
The "swamp" characterization of law on mixed-motive cases in employment
discrimination law captures the consistent judicial inconsistency in these cases. I borrowed
the "swamp" label from Paul N. Cox, Substance and Processin Employment Discrimination
Law: One View of the Swamp, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 21 (1993). Professor Cox provides an
especially useful general discussion of both the disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories of discrimination, and he argues that the disparate impact theory is incoherent.
At least one court has noted that "recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has been rather
volatile." Bartek v. Urban Redev. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 739, 742 (3d Cir. 1989).
The author has visited with the problems created by McDonnell Douglas and Price
Waterhouse on prior occasions.
See Robert Belton, Causation in Employment
DiscriminationLaw, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235 (1988); Robert Belton, Causationand BurdenShifting Doctrines in Employment DiscriminationLaw: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and
Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1359 (1990).
1. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2. We now have a dazzling array of federal statutory laws, executive orders, and
regulations that make it an unlawful employment practice for employers, employment
agencies, and labor organizations to make employment decisions because of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999) (race, color, religion,
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opportunity to prove intentional discrimination despite the unavailability
of direct evidence.3
The McDonnell Douglas framework is used
primarily in cases litigated under the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination4 and is based upon presumptions and burden-shifting
schemes.5
McDonnell Douglas was the predominant analytical
framework for statutory employment discrimination cases until the
Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins' in 1989.
In Price Waterhouse the Court recognized for the first time a new
analytical framework for disparate treatment cases. The new analytical
model is the mixed-motive case. In a mixed-motive case, the evidence
is sufficient to allow the factfinder to conclude, as a matter of fact, that
an employer's employment decision was motivated by both lawful and
unlawful reasons.7 The mixed-motive case is often contrasted with a

sex, and national origin discrimination); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)
(race discrimination); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621634 (West 1999 & Supp. 1999); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). For a more complete survey of laws prohibiting
discrimination in employment, see ROBERT BELTON & DIANNE AVERY, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 26-36 (6th
ed. 1999).
3. McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 800. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 121 (1985); see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
252 (1981).
4. The courts have struggled mightily to respond to legislative silence on the meaning
of key concepts, such as "discriminate" and "because of," in many of the laws prohibiting
discrimination in employment. In doing so, the Supreme Court has enunciated two
theories of discrimination that have dominated most of the employment discrimination law
jurisprudence: disparate treatment and disparate impact.
Disparate treatment discrimination occurs, for example, when an employer intentionally
treats an individual less favorably because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Disparate impact discrimination occurs, for example, when an employer makes employment
decisions based upon a facially neutral policy or practice that has a disproportionately
adverse impact on the employment opportunities of a protected class, such as blacks or
women, and the policy or practice cannot be justified by business necessity. A critical
distinction between the two theories is the element of intent. Intent, or discriminatory
motivation, is the critical element a plaintiff must prove to establish a violation in a
disparate treatment case; however, intent is not an element in a disparate impact case.
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
A third theory of discrimination, failure to reasonably accommodate an individual with
a disability, is available only in cases involving disability claims. See, e.g., Pamela S.
Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities,Discrimination,and Reasonable Accommodation,
46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-4 (1996) (summarizing the differences in remedies provided by various
antidiscrimination statutes).
5. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,50607 (1993).
6. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
7. See id. at 246-47 (plurality opinion).
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single-motive pretext case,8 which is illustrated in McDonnell Douglas.
The factual issue in a pretext case is whether either a lawful or an
unlawful reason, but not both, was the motivation for the at-issue
employment decision.9 However, the legislative history of Title VII is
clear on the point that a plaintiff is not required to prove that discriminatory animus was the sole reason for an adverse employment decision.1 °
In Price Waterhouse the Court endorsed the same proof scheme for
mixed-motive cases arising under Title VII that it previously had
adopted in Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle." Mt. Healthy was
a mixed-motive employment case arising under the Constitution.12
Under Price Waterhouse a plaintiff must first prove that an unlawful
reason was a substantial or motivating factor in an employment
decision." If the plaintiff carries that burden, then the burden shifts
to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have made the same decision absent reliance on the unlawful
reason. 4 The fundamental holding of Price Waterhouse is that, in a
mixed-motive case, an employer can avoid liability by prevailing on the

8. Some of the different labels used to describe the McDonnell Douglas framework are
pretext, indirect evidence, and circumstantial evidence cases.
9. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (citing NLRB v. Transp Management Corp.,
462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 (1983)) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
10. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 n.7 (observing that Congress purposefully
rejected an amendment to Title VII that would have placed the word "solely" before the

words "because of" in section 703(a)(1)).
11. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
12. An issue the Court has never resolved is whether constitutional norms should be
applied in statutory employment discrimination cases against public employers. In
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976), the Court expressly rejected the view
that the Title VII disparate impact theory was applicable to employment discrimination
claims against public employers that are based solely on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v. Davis was a test case brought expressly for the
purpose of testing whether the Title VII disparate impact theory is equally applicable to
employment discrimination claims against public employers. The rationale for the results
in Washington v. Davis appears to be that the nature of discrimination prohibited under
the Equal Protection Clause is qualitatively different from the discrimination that is
prohibited under Title VII. In Price Waterhouse a Title VII statutory employment case, the
Court, without even acknowledging Washington v. Davis, held that the constitutional norm
on mixed-motive cases in Mt. Healthy is equally applicable to Title VII mixed-motive cases.
490 U.S. at 247 n.12, 248-49, 254; id. at 258-61 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 268 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citing another Equal Protection mixed-motive case, Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
13. 490 U.S. at 258.
14. Id.
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same-decision defense.15 After Price Waterhouse the majority of the
lower courts sharply distinguished between the McDonnell Douglas and
Price Waterhouse analytical frameworks.'
Congress overturned the fundamental holding of Price Waterhouse in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Congress's decision to overturn Price
Waterhouse and the language it adopted in doing so have created
additional confusion in the long-standing debate about how to achieve
equality in the workplace. McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse
stand at the apex of the debate. 7 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
overturns the fundamental holding of Price Waterhouse, further muddles
the substantive and procedural swamp in employment discrimination
law by raising a number of issues over which the courts are consistently
inconsistent. Two of those issues are the subject of this Article. 8 The
first issue is whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 erased the distinction
between McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse. The second issue
concerns the reach and limits of a court's discretion to award make-

15. Id.
16.

See, e.g., Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 230 (4th Cir. 1999); Ingram

v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 897 F.2d 1450, 1454 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990); Bartek v. Urban Redev.
Auth. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 739, 742 (3d Cir. 1989); Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co.,
881 F.2d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 1989); Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307,
1313 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1989). See generally Steven M. Tindall, Note, Do As She Does, Not As
She Says: The Shortcomings of Justice O'Connor'sDirect Evidence Requirement in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 332, 354-64 (1996).
17. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: DisparateTreatment After Hicks, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2311-24 (1995) (arguing that the McDonnell Douglas proof structure
should be abandoned); George Rutherglen, Reconsidering Burdens of Proof: Ideology,
Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of Employment Discrimination,1 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & LAw 43, 44-46 (1993). Professor Rutherglen has argued that much of the difficulty
with the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework is that it arose at the intersection of
constitutional and labor law. The constitutional dimension looks to intent; the labor law
dimension looks to good cause. These "divergent" origins, he argues, account for much of
the ambiguity and ineffectiveness ofMcDonnell Douglasand Price Waterhouse to ferret out
unlawful discrimination. See id. at 47.
18. Some of the other issues include whether a plaintiff may bring a mixed-motive
retaliation employment discrimination claim. See, e.g., McNutt v. Board of Trustees of the
Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 707 (7th Cir. 1998) (mixed-motive claim unavailable); Woodson
v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 934-35 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Medlock v. Ortho Biotech,
Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 553 (10th Cir. 1999) (mixed-motive claim available). See generally,
Sandra Tafuri, Title VI's Antiretaliation Provision: Are Employees Protected After the
Employment RelationshipHas Ended?, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 797, 798 (1996). For treatment
of the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on summary judgment motions, motions for
judgment as a matter of law, and the problem of proper instructions to juries, see Karen
Haase, Mixed Metaphors: Model Civil Jury Instructionsfor Title VII DisparateTreatment
Claims, 76 NEB. L. REV. 900 (1997). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is conspicuously silent
on many of these issues.
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whole and rightful place relief when employers are successful on the
statutory same-decision defense.
This Article offers some observations on these two questions. It also
briefly comments upon the developing law on mixed-motive cases under
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").
II.

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AND PRICE WATERHOUSE: A BRIEF

OVERVIEW
The difference between the burden-shifting frameworks of a McDonnell
Douglaspretext case and a PriceWaterhouse mixed-motive case has been
the subject of a substantial amount of critical commentary' 9-especially
since St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks ° and the enactment of the Civil

19. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives and Maleness: A CriticalView of Mixed-Motive
Doctrine in Title VII Sex DiscriminationCases, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1029, 1033 (relying on
feminist and postmodern theory to argue that the mixed-motive doctrine disadvantages
women); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition 11: Price Waterhouse and the
Individual Employment DiscriminationCase, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1023, 1026-30 (1990);
Roy L. Brooks, The Structure of IndividualDisparateTreatment Litigation After Hopkins,
6 LAB. LAW. 215, 226 (1990) (suggesting the Price Waterhouse resolution of Title VII
causation lacks clarity); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretationof Action and
the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17,96-107
(1991); Charles A. Sullivan,Accountingfor Price Waterhouse: ProvingDisparateTreatment
Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1136-39 (1991); Tindall, supra note 16, at 364-65
(arguing that the test is both confusing and overly restrictive); Michael A. Zubrensky, Note,
Despite the Smoke, There Is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Motives
Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. L. REV. 959, 980-86 (1994)
(arguing that Congress should enact specific legislation on an evidentiary standard for
mixed-motive cases that is consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence). But see Joseph
J. Ward, Note, A Call for Price Waterhouse II: The Legacy of Justice O'Connor's Direct
Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment DiscriminationClaims, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 627, 629 (1997) (arguing for a stringent test of direct evidence for mixed-motive
analysis).
20. The Court's 1993 decision in Hicks is the latest effort to clarify the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Hicks has generally sparked a great deal of criticism in the scholarly
literature. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning
the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 998 (1994); William R. Corbett, The "Fall"of
Summers, the Rise of 'Pretext Plus," and the Escalating Subordination of Federal
Employment DiscriminationLaw to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and
Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 342-58 (1996); Malamud, supra note 17, at 2311-24 (arguing
that the McDonnell Douglas analytical scheme should be abandoned in light of Hicks);
Mark A. Schuman, The Politicsof Presumptions: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and the
Burdens of Proofin Employment DiscriminationCases, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
67, 84-95 (1993); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 328-34 (1997).
Judge Denny Chin, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
is the co-author of an article that criticizes McDonnell Douglasand suggests an alternative
to weighing and evaluating the evidence in employment discrimination cases. See Denny
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Rights Act of 1991. The mixed-motive category did not emerge as an

analytical model in statutory employment discrimination cases until
after the Supreme Court decided Mt. Healthy,2 even though the issue
had been present in Title VII cases prior to Mt. Healthy.22 The

Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for
Assessing Evidence in DiscriminationCases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 668-79 (1998).
21. A main reason mixed-motive cases did not emerge as a factual paradigm in the
early development under Title VII is that a substantial amount of attention during the first
decade of litigation under Title VII was devoted to (1) broad-based pattern or practice cases
and (2) class action cases involving, for example, sex-based limitations on the employment
opportunities of women, and the continuing effects of overt racially discriminatory policies
that many employers, public and private, had adopted prior to the effective date of Title
VII. See generally Robert Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of
Private Enforcement and JudicialDevelopments, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J. 225, 246-49 (1976);
Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the Southern Jurisprudenceof
Employment Discrimination,6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 313, 346-50 (1984).
A change in the composition of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, brought
with it a judicial retreat from the liberal interpretation of Title VII and other laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment. In commenting upon the change in the judicial
response to employment discrimination claims, one scholar observed that
[h]istorically the Fifth Circuit has been a very important site for the development of anti-discrimination law. The Fifth Circuit cases decided in the first
decade after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 held out the promise of
an end to racial segregation and stratification in the workplace. Class actions
attacking policies on hiring, promotion and transfer "across the board," judicial
mistrust of subjective procedures and a presumption of discrimination in a high
percentage of individual cases gave plaintiffs leverage to challenge longstanding
traditions of racial segregation. The challenge posed by these early cases was cut
short, however, by a retreat by the United States Supreme Court starting in the
late 1970s. By the 1980s, patterns of racial segregation were more often defended
in the courts as a product of choice or custom, rather than as an artifact of
discrimination. The class action has all but disappeared from the scene, and high
burdens of proof had been imposed on plaintiffs trying to show either intentional
discrimination or group-based adverse impact. The focus of Title VII changed
from the creation of new opportunities through hiring, promotion, and affirmative
action to a far less ambitious emphasis on curtailing dismissals and layoffs of
protected groups. When they surfaced, liberal visions of equality were often
submerged in dissents.
Martha Chamallas, Racial Segregationand CulturalDomination:A Rubin Trilogy on Title
VII, 52 LA. L. REV. 1457, 1458-59 (1992).
22. See Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff
in Mt. Healthy relied upon Title VII cases in his brief to support his argument that he was
presumptively entitled to relief upon proving that he was terminated in part because of his
speech, which was constitutionally protected. According to plaintiffs brief:
A useful analogy is found in decisions dealing with the question who is entitled
to a "make-whole" remedy where racial discrimination in employment has been
proved. Where, for example, an employer is shown to have engaged in a pattern
and practice of racial discrimination in hiring, the impermissible factor of race can
be said to have played a part each time a black employee was denied a job. But,
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predominant analytical model for the statutory cases prior to Mt.
Healthy was the framework announced by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas. After Price Waterhouse the courts tended to
categorize employment discrimination cases as either pretext or mixedmotive cases, and the courts have treated these cases as essentially two
mutually exclusive proof schemes in employment discrimination law.
In a pretext case, which the courts analyze solely under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case,
the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the employer
who must then articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment decision.23 If the employer introduces evidence of
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the burden of production shifts
back to the plaintiff who must show that the employer's proffered
explanation is untrue or unworthy of credence.24 At all times, the
burden of proof or risk of nonpersuasion, including the burden of proving
but-for causation or causation-in-fact, remains with the plaintiff.25
A majority of courts addressing the issue have made a clear distinction
between a McDonnell Douglas pretext case and a Price Waterhouse
mixed-motive case on one key element.26 Most courts have held that
a plaintiff must introduce either direct evidence that the employer's
decision was the product of discriminatory motivation or substantially

in some circumstances, an employer may be able to prove that notwithstanding
its racial discrimination, the applicant would have been denied a job in any event
for other legitimate reasons. This Court held in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., [424] U.S. [7471,44 L.W. 4356, 4363, and 4363, n. 32 (1976), that, in such
circumstances, each black applicant is "presumptively entitled" to make-whole
relief, and that the employer has the burden of defeating that entitlement with
respect to any particular employee by proving that the employee would have been
denied a job regardless of the race factor. As the Court in Franks put it, 'No
reason appears ... why the victim rather than the perpetrator of the illegal act
should bear the burden of proof on this issue." Ibid.
Brief for Respondent at 43-44, Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977) (No. 75-1278); see also East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S.
395 (1977) (applying Mt. Healthy in a section 1981 case); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318,
1326 (8th Cir. 1985) (Lay, J., concurring) (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n.5).
Bowman Transportationand Teamsters were Title VII class action disparate treatment
cases. Justice O'Connor distinguished the Title VII class action and individual cases in
Price Waterhouse. See 490 U.S. at 265-66 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
23. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252.
24. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
25. Id. at 253.
26. See Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232-33 (suggesting the McDonnell Douglas approach is less
advantageous than mixed-motive approach); Hankins v. City of Phila., 189 F.3d 353, 364
(3d Cir. 1999), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 188 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1999); EEOC v.
Wiltel, 81 F.3d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1996).

658

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

more evidence than is required under the McDonnell Douglas framework." If the plaintiff is fortunate enough to have evidence that falls
under the direct evidence rubric,2" then the employer has the burden
of persuasion to prove that it would have made the same decision if the
unlawful motivation played no role in the employment decision.2 9
Under Price Waterhouse direct evidence of discriminatory motivation
leaves the employer only the affirmative defense of same-decision or the
argument that but-for cause or cause-in-fact has not been proved. °
The significance of Price Waterhouse to the issue of whether the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 erased the distinction between direct and pretext (or
circumstantial) evidence lies primarily in Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion. Justice Brennan stated the holding for only a plurality of the
Court. The plurality's statement of the holding is substantively different
from what Justice O'Connor deems the holding to be. Nothing in Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion suggests that a plaintiff must present direct
evidence to shift the burden of proving same-decision to the employer.
In fact, Justice Brennan stated that simply because he had focused on
the specific evidence Hopkins had introduced, he was not suggesting a
limitation on the nature of the evidence a plaintiff may rely upon to
prove the motivating factor element."' Justice O'Connor, on the other
hand, endorsed the view that direct evidence is required in mixed-motive
cases.3 2 Although she stated that the rule announced in Price Waterhouse should be viewed as a "supplement to the careful framework
established" in McDonnell Douglas, it is clear that Justice O'Connor
advocated an extremely high evidentiary standard for plaintiffs in
mixed-motive cases. 3 She succeeded in drawing a bright-line distinction between the circumstantial and mixed-motive cases with her direct
evidence standard.
A frequently overlooked line of reasoning in Justice O'Connor's opinion
in Price Waterhouse, on which her direct evidence rule is grounded, is
based on her construction of section 703(j) of Title VII:
Finally, I am convinced that a rule shifting the burden to the
defendant where the plaintiff has shown that an illegitimate criterion

27.
28.
29.
30.

See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45.
Id. at 246.

31. Id. at 251-52.
32. Id. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("What is required is what
Ann Hopkins showed here: direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative
reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision.").
33. Id. at 261.
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was a "substantial factor" in the employment decision will not conflict

with other congressional policies embodied in Title VII. Title VII
expressly provides that an employer need not give preferential
treatment to employees or applicants of any race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin in order to maintain a work force in balance with the
general population. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j). The interpretive
memorandum, whose authoritative force is noted by the plurality,
specifically provides: "There is no requirement in title VII that an
employer maintain a racial balance in his work force. On the contrary,
any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a
balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance would require an employer to hire or refuse to hire
on the basis of race.'a 4
She then cited her plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust,35 a Title VII disparate impact case. 36 In Watson she relied

substantially on section 703(j) to promulgate a very high evidentiary
threshold that a plaintiff must satisfy not only to establish a prima facie
case of 37disparate impact discrimination, but also to ultimately prove
liability.

Justice O'Connor's view that the reality of societal discrimination
should not influence, in any way, the rules and doctrines courts adopt in
interpreting laws prohibiting either constitutional or statutory discrimination is well known." The direct evidence standard that Justice
O'Connor adopted in Price Waterhouse incorporates into statutory
employment discrimination cases her interpretation of section 703(j) that
the courts must turn a blind eye to societal discrimination in formulating rules and doctrines.
III.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO PRICE WATERHOUSE

Congress amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against the
backdrop of McDonnell Douglas,Mt. Healthy, and Price Waterhouse by

34. Id. at 274 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964)) (citation omitted).
35. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
36. 490 U.S. at 274 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
37. 487 U.S. at 992 (plurality opinion). In Wards Cove Packing Co. v Atonio, 490 U.S.
642, 656 (1989), a majority of the Court agreed with Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
in Watson. Wards Cove was one of a number of cases that prompted Congress to enact the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Congress's response to Wards Cove is found in Title VII, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k).
38. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995); Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 613-14 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). See generally Selmi, supra note 20, at 333-35.
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adding, among other provisions, two new provisions that explicitly cover
federal statutory mixed-motive employment discrimination cases.39
One provision, section 703(m), states, "Except as otherwise provided in
this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice."
provision, section 706(g)(2)(B), states,

°

The other

On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section
[703(m)] of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as
provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated
to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under
section [703(m)] of this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment,
described in subparagraph (A).41
The two new provisions in Title VII were enacted to abrogate the
fundamental holding of Price Waterhouse insofar as that decision
permitted an employer in a mixed-motive case to completely escape a
finding of liability by proving the same-decision defense.42

39. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted, in large part, to overturn or modify a
series of Supreme Court decisions, including Price Waterhouse. See Landgrafv. USI Film
Prods., Inc., 511 U.S. 244, 250 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 45-47 (1991), reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583-85; H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), at 16-19 (1991), reprintedin
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 709-12.
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m).
41. Id § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Congress also defined the term "demonstrate" in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to encompass both the burdens of production of evidence and the burden
of persuasion. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
42. There were two other significant holdings in Price Waterhouse, neither of which was
affected by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The first was that evidence of sex stereotyping
is sufficient as direct evidence to prove unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII. Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251; id. at 272 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
See generally Bisom-Rapp, supra note 19, at 1040-47; Tracy L. Bach, Note, Gender
Stereotyping in Employment Discrimination:Finding a Balanceof Evidence and Causation
Under Title VII, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1251, 1264 (1993). The second unaffected holding was
that the preponderance of evidence standard rather than the clear and convincing standard
controls whether an employer has satisfied its burden of proof on the same-decision
defense. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 45-47
(1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583-85.
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However, Congress did not address some crucial issues on the role of
the same-decision defense in mixed-motive cases when it overturned the
fundamental holding of Price Waterhouse. One of the most critical
questions Congress failed to address was whether a plaintiff must
introduce direct evidence to shift the burden of persuasion on the samedecision defense to the employer. Although there is nothing on the face
of section 703(m) that speaks directly to this issue, there are references
in the legislative history to the notion of stray remarks. The section of
House Report 102-40(I) setting out congressional intent to overturn Price

Waterhouse states,
Some opponents... contend that making unlawful any consideration
of race or gender in the employment decision would make an employer
liable for "mere thoughts" or "stray thoughts" in the workplace.
Conduct or statements are relevant under [the amendment] only if the
plaintiff shows a nexus between the conduct or statements and the
employment decision at issue, under the standards generally applicable
in weighing the sufficiency of the evidence. For example, isolated or
stray remarks not shown to have contributed to the employment
decision at issue are not sufficient to establish liability.... Thus, in
providing liability for discrimination that is a "contributingfactor," the
Committee intends to restore the rule applied in many federal circuits
prior to the Price Waterhouse decision that an employer may be held
liable for any discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a
contested employment decision.4"
It is unclear from the legislative history quoted above whether
Congress's reference to stray remarks was necessarily intended to
embrace Justice O'Connor's direct evidence standard for cases arising
under section 703(m). However, it is clear that Congress did not
affirmatively embrace the direct evidence standard. Congress's failure
to address some of these crucial issues has resulted in a great deal of
confusion and conflict in the lower courts." In fact, the legislative
history is singularly uninstructive on the substantive standard to be
applied in mixed-motive employment discrimination cases.
The antecedent to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is the failed Civil
Rights Act of 1990. 45 Both the Senate and House versions of the Civil

43.

H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(l), at 48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 586.

44. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 581-84 (1st Cir.
1999) (collecting cases on the various definitions of "direct evidence" that have been
endorsed by the courts on the issue of whether mixed-motive cases require direct evidence).
45. President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990. For a useful compilation of the
legislative histories of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see
THE CIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Douglas S. McDowell ed., 1992)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
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Rights Act of 1990 declared a congressional intent to rectify what they
perceived as the Court's flawed decision in Price Waterhouse. The
legislative histories of the two bills, however, show that the major debate
about rectifying Price Waterhouse was whether the new statute should
read, "discriminatory practice need not be the sole motivating factor,"
or
46
"discriminatory practice need not be the sole contributing factor."
IV.

A.

MIXED-MOTIVE CASES: THE AFTERMATH OF THE CVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1991

The Meaning of "DirectEvidence"

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 enables a plaintiff to establish a violation
of Title VII by demonstrating that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a "motivating factor" as a condition precedent to receiving a
mixed-motive instruction. Although the courts generally agree that
plaintiffs must introduce direct evidence of a "motivating factor" under
section 703(m),47 they have "about as many definitions of 'direct
evidence' as they do employment discrimination cases."' These various
definitions were recently and succinctly summarized by the First Circuit
in Fernandes v. Costa Brothers Masonry, Inc.49 Direct evidence is
classically defined as evidence that, if believed, proves the fact of
discriminatory motivation without inference, presumption, or resort to
other evidence. The "animus plus" jurisdictions define direct evidence
to include both the classical definition and circumstantial evidence so
long as the evidence satisfies a two-pronged test: (1) it reflects directly
discriminatory motivation, and (2) it bears squarely on the at-issue
employment decision. The third set of jurisdictions define direct
evidence to include both direct and circumstantial evidence, whether or

46. For example, the purpose of House Bill 4000, the House's original version of the
1990 Act, was to adopt the theory espoused by the EEOC and the Department of Justice
("DOJ") in their amicus brief submitted in Price Waterhouse. See Iid. at 171-72. The DOJ
and EEOC believed, much the same as the lower courts, that any discriminatory
motivation in the mixed-motive, same-decision cases was "dispositive of the question of

liability, leaving open only the scope of the appropriate remedy." 1 id. at 171. To this end,
House Bill 4000, as originally introduced, provided that the discriminatory practice did not

have to be the only motivating factor. 1 id. at 15. On July 30, 1999, Rep. LaFalce (D-NY)
offered a substitute bill changing the standard to "contributing factor" as a replacement for
"motivating factor." 1 id. at 79, 82. Also, House Bill 1, a predecessor bill to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, used the phrase "contributing factor" rather than the phrase
.motivating factor." 2 id. at 5.
47. See, e.g., Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 581.
48. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir. 1992).

49. 199 F.3d at 581-83 (collecting cases).
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not it bears directly on the discriminatory motivation with respect to the
at-issue employment decision.50
The different definitions of direct evidence underscore the obvious:
The line between McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse is very
murky. Furthermore, the various definitions raise the question whether
the courts' attempts to draw bright-line tests between direct and
circumstantial evidence are really helpful at all.5
B. Does the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Erase the Distinction
Between Pretext and Mixed-Motive Cases?
Prior to Price Waterhouse, courts applied the McDonnell Douglas
framework to cases in which plaintiffs relied upon either circumstantial
or direct evidence, but did not make any significant distinction between
pretext and mixed-motive cases. 2 The determination whether an
employer's decision was motivated by unlawful discrimination is a fact

question," and courts have held that this fact can be proven by either
circumstantial or direct evidence.54 At least one court has rejected the

view that circumstantial evidence is inherently weaker than direct
evidence.55
After Price Waterhouse many courts began to draw very sharp
distinctions between pretext and mixed-motive cases. The distinction
was grounded essentially in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in

50. Id. at 582. The three different approaches to direct evidence correspond to the
categories of the nonrestrictive standard, the direct evidence standard, and the
circumstantial evidence-plus standard. See Zubrensky, supra note 19, at 970-78.
51. See Malamud, supra note 17, at 2311 (suggesting that McDonnell Douglas does a
poor job of setting the standards for pretrial decisionmaking, particularly at the summary
judgment stage).
52. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (considering Price Waterhouse to be a "departure from the McDonnell Douglas
standard"); id. at 290 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality for not recognizing,
as Justice O'Connor did, that Price Waterhouse is a "departure from the McDonnell Douglas
standard").
53. The determination whether a plaintiff has proven intentional discrimination is a
question of fact that is to be decided by a jury in discrimination cases in which either party
is entitled to demand a jury trial. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289
(1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994) (explaining that a plaintiff seeking relief under the
disparate treatment theory in a Title VII or ADA case is entitled to a jury if compensatory
or punitive damages are sought).
54. See United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
55. See Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States
v. Sureff, 15 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 526
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the McDonnell Douglasframework permits "plaintiffs
and the courts to deal effectively with employment discrimination revealed only through
circumstantial evidence").
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Price Waterhouse. Justice O'Connor was the only Justice who voted with
the majority and took the position that direct evidence is necessary to
entitle a plaintiff to a mixed-motive analysis.56 The fundamental
difficulty with Justice O'Connor's position is that she rejected the
classical definition of direct evidence.57 Instead, she defined direct
evidence negatively:
[S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual
harassment, cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that its
hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria. Nor
can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers
unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff's
burden in this regard.... Race and gender always "play a role" in an
employment decision in the benign sense that these are human
characteristics of which decisionmakers are aware and about which
they may comment in a perfectly neutral and nondiscriminatory
fashion. For example, in the context of this case, a mere reference to
.a lady candidate" might show that gender "played a role" in the
decision, but by no means could support a rational factfinder's
inference that the decision was made "because of" sex. What is
required is ... direct evidence that decisionmakers place substantial
negative5 8reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their
decision.
Lower courts focused on the "stray remarks" reasoning of Justice
O'Connor to develop an analysis for determining whether the evidence
introduced by a plaintiff constituted direct evidence.59 The theory for
relying on Justice O'Connor's stray remarks doctrine is that when the
Supreme Court rules by means of a plurality in a case, such as Price
Waterhouse, inferior courts should give effect to the narrowest ground on
which a majority of the Justices would agree.6 °
V.

LIMITATIONS ON RELIEF

Section 706 of Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
limits the discretion of a court to award full relief to proven victims of
unlawful employment discrimination.6 ' The amendment to section 706

56. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. See Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 581.
58. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citation omitted).
59. See, e.g., Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, 85 F.3d 1311, 1315-16 (8th Cir.
1996); Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Elecs., 82 F.3d 1397, 1403 (7th Cir. 1997).
60. See Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 580; Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1182.
61. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
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does not change the respective burdens imposed on plaintiffs and
defendants; it simply affects the nature of the remedies available to a
plaintiff if both parties satisfy their respective burdens.62 A major
difference between establishing liability in a McDonnell Douglas pretext
case and a mixed-motive case under Price Waterhouse, as modified by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is that the plaintiff in the pretext case is
the beneficiary of a presumption of entitlement to all appropriate forms
of relief. The same-decision defense, if proven by an employer, severely
circumscribes the discretion a court otherwise has to award complete
make-whole and rightful-place relief to a proven victim of unlawful
discrimination.6 3 Section 706(g)(2)(B) specifically excludes damages such
as back pay, front pay, reinstatement orders, hiring orders, and
promotion orders.'
The courts have65 held that compensatory and
punitive damages are excluded as well.
VI.

MIXED-MOTIVE CASES UNDER THE ADA

In a student-written Note published in 1995, the author argued that
mixed-motive analysis should not be allowed under the ADA;66 however, the courts have held that employment discrimination claims under
the ADA are subject to the same analysis under either a McDonnell
Douglas or a Price Waterhouse framework, depending upon whether the
plaintiff has direct evidence.67

62. See Medlock, 164 F.3d at 551 n.3.
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii). See generally ROBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1992 & Supp. 1999) (covering the kinds of relief-for
example, back pay, front pay, and a broad range of injunctive relief-that a court may
award in statutory employment discrimination cases) [hereinafter REMEDIES]. In two
cases, Albemarle PaperCo. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-21 (1975), and Franks v. Bowman
TransportationCo., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976), the Supreme Court enunciated a strong
rebuttable presumption that proven victims of unlawful employment discrimination are
entitled to all forms of make-whole and rightful-place relief. Moreover, in City of Los
Angeles Departmentof Water & Power v. Manhart,435 U.S. 702, 719 (1978), the Court held
that the presumptive entitlement rule is seldom overcome. See also REMEDIES, supra,
§§ 3.7-3.10.
64. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
65. See, e.g., Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301-03 (8th Cir. 1995).
66. John L. Flynn, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked Statutes, Fuzzy
Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEO. L.J. 2009, 2067 (1995).
67. See, e.g., Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 918 (8th Cir. 1999) (instructing
specifically that either McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse "motivating factor" not
required); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1997); Pedigo, 60 F.3d
at 1301. Other courts have expressly noted the issue but have declined to address it. See,
e.g., Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 1995).
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The arguments in favor of allowing mixed-motive cases under the ADA
are quite strong, even though Congress did not explicitly amend the
ADA to include a provision comparable to section 703(m) in Title VII."5
First, the statutory definition of discrimination in the ADA includes
disparate treatment claims because one of the statutory definitions is
patterned after the same provision in Title VII on which the disparate
treatment theory is grounded.69 Second, the ADA provides that the
remedies available under the ADA are the same as those that are
available under Title VII. 70 A plaintiff in a mixed-motive case brought

under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would be entitled to complete makewhole and rightful-place relief should the employer lose on its samedecision defense.
VII.

THE IMPACT OF THE SAME-DECISION DEFENSE ON RELIEF

Stevens v. Gravette Medical Center Hospital,7 decided several years
ago, strongly suggests that in cases in which employers are successful
on the same-decision defense, a plaintiff's success in proving that she is
a victim of unlawful discrimination will, in all probability, result only in
a Pyrrhic victory. Stevens involved a Title VII sex discrimination claim
in which the jury found that plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the
employer's decision to deny plaintiff a promotion, but that the employer
would have made the same decision without considering his sex.
Plaintiff sought nominal damages, a declaratory judgment that the
employer had engaged in a pattern and practice of discriminating
against its employees because of sex, an injunction restraining the
employer from further discrimination on the basis of sex, and attorney
fees. 72 The district court found plaintiff was entitled to a declaration

68. Congress specifically amended the ADA in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to make
compensatory and punitive damages available. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1994).
69. Compare, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). For a critique of applying the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting rule to the ADA, see Flynn, supra note 66; Lianane C. Knych, Note, Assessing the
Application of McDonnell Douglas to Employment DiscriminationClaims Brought Under
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (1995). The limitations on
medical inquiries under the ADA present a unique set of issues involving mixed-motive
analysis. For a treatment of these issues, see Jan W. Sturner, Comment, Preemployment
Medical Exams Under the ADA: ConditionalJob Offers and the Application of the MixedMotives Framework, 50 ARK. L. REV. 449, 470-79 (1997).
71. 998 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Ark. 1998).
72. Id. at 1012-13.
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that the employer violated Title VII while denying all his other requests
for relief.73
Nominal damages are traditionally awarded in cases in which
compensatory damages are available even though the plaintiff has not
established the degree of injury necessary to support an award of
punitive damages. Acknowledging this rule, the court in Stevens
nevertheless denied plaintiff's request for nominal damages.74 Because
compensatory damages are unavailable under Title VII in mixed-motive
cases when an employer has been successful on the same-decision
defense, the court reasoned it would be improper to award nominal
damages because they are a substitute for compensatory damages.75
Plaintiff's argument for a declaratory judgment was based on his
theory that the evidence supported a finding that the employer had
engaged in a pattern or practice of intentional sex discrimination against
male employees by not assigning them to the OB/GYN section of the
hospital. 76 The court denied his request for a declaratory judgment on
the ground that the jury was not instructed to determine whether a
pattern or practice against males existed at the hospital.77 Implicit in
the court's refusal to award declaratory judgment was the understanding
that proof of an employer's pattern or practice of intentional discrimination may support not only a declaratory judgment with respect to that
practice, but also a broad-based injunction against the continuation of
the practice. Under the court's reasoning, an individual must show a
causal connection between the injury to himself and the pattern and
practice of discriminatory conduct. 7' The implicit rule would certainly
be particularly important in some of the sexual harassment cases.
The court rejected plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief on the ground
that an injunction should not issue when there is no reasonable basis to
conclude that the unlawful conduct is likely to continue into the
future.79
Finally, relying in substantial part on the Supreme Court's decision in
Farrarv. Hobby,"0 the court denied plaintiff's request for attorney

73.

Id. at 1021; see also 5 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 93.09 (2d

ed. 1994).
74. 998 F. Supp. at 1015 (citing 5 LARSON, supra note 73, § 93.09; see also REMEDIES,
supra note 63, § 12.11.
75. 998 F. Supp. at 1015.
76. Id. at 1013.
77. Id. at 1015.
78. Id. at 1015-16.
79. Id. at 1016.
80. 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
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fees. 8 ' In Farrarthe Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must obtain
some relief on the merits of his claim to qualify as a prevailing party for
a statutory award of attorney fees; thus, he must obtain an enforceable
judgment. 82 The judgment in favor of the plaintiff must substantially
alter the relationship between the parties whereby the employer
modifies its behavior "in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." 3
The Court held that although a technical or Pyrrhic victory of only
nominal damages is sufficient to confer prevailing party status on a
plaintiff,
the reasonable attorney fee in such a case will ordinarily be
4
8

zero.

The court in Stevens also relied upon the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Pedigo v. PA.M. Thansport, Inc. 5 In Pedigo the Eighth Circuit
specifically considered whether section 706(g)(2)(B)(ii) allows an award
of attorney fees when both the plaintiff and the defendant have satisfied
their respective burdens in a mixed-motive case. 6 Section 706 provides
that a court "may grant ...attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be
directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section
703(m)."

7

Relying on Farrar,the Eighth Circuit in Pedigo denied a

request for fees in an ADA case because a judicial pronouncement, such
as a declaratory judgment, that is unenforceable does not give the
plaintiff the status of a prevailing party.8
In Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc.,89 the Tenth Circuit
rejected the view that Farrarstands for the proposition that every
nonmonetary victory precludes an award of attorney fees in statutory
mixed-motive employment discrimination cases.9 The Tenth Circuit
looked to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Farrarin which she
listed some factors that should be considered in determining whether
fees would be available despite recovery of only nominal damages. 9'

81. 998 F. Supp. at 1016-21.
82. 506 U.S. at 111.
83. Id. at 111-12.
84. Id. at 112-15.
85. 98 F.3d 396 (8th Cir. 1996).
86. Id. at 397-98.
87. See supra note 41.
88. Pedigo, 98 F.3d at 398. One of the leading cases on the award of attorney fees in
mixed-motive cases in employment discrimination law is Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing
Center, Inc., 88 F.3d 1332 (4th Cir. 1996).
89. 158 F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 1998).
90. Id. at 1081.
91. Id. at 1078.
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These factors include the significance of the legal issue involved and
whether the claim serves a public purpose.92
VIII. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a
watershed development in the national commitment to making equality
in the workplace a reality. Since the enactment of Title VII, the
legislative and administrative branches of the federal government have
enacted or adopted a dazzling array of laws and orders that make it
unlawful to discriminate in employment because of race, color, sex,
religion, national origin, age, and disability.93 These laws raise three
difficult legal and policy issues: (1) what is discrimination, (2) how is it
proven, and (3) if proven, what are appropriate remedies? Not only have
the courts within the federal system often disagreed about the appropriate responses to these questions, but the courts and Congress have also
frequently disagreed.
The circumstances that led to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991" are some of the most recent illustrations of significant disagreements between the Supreme Court and Congress that implicate each of
the three basic legal and policy issues in employment discrimination
law.95 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 because it
concluded that the Supreme Court had substantially eroded the national
commitment to workplace equality in a series of Supreme Court

92. See Farrar,506 U.S. at 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. Among some of the more important legislative initiatives in addition to Title VII
are the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1999
& Supp. 1999); Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1211112117 (1994); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (West 1999 & Supp.
1999); and the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438 (Supp. IV
1998).

94. See supra notes 42-46.
95. Other illustrations of the disagreement between the Court and Congress include

the following: the Pregnancy Disability Amendment to Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-(k)
(overturning the Court's holding in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), that
discrimination because of pregnancy is not sex discrimination); section 701(j) of Title VII,
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-(j) (defining the term "religion" to avoid a potential constitutional
question in light of the Court's decision in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th
Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971)). Congress also
overturned the Court's decision in PublicEmployees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492
U.S. 158 (1989), by amending the ADEA to eliminate the term "subterfuge" in a statutory

defense and to endorse the EEOC's cost-based justification defense. See 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 623(f)(2).
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decisions,"
most of which had been decided during the Court's 1988
97
Tern.
Price Waterhouse was one of the principal Supreme Court cases that
Congress deemed particularly inimical to the goal of remedying
employment discrimination in the workplace.98 It is beyond dispute
that Congress's intent in overruling the fundamental holding in Price
Waterhouse was to clarify the law on mixed-motive Title VII employment
discrimination cases. Regrettably, congressional silence on a number of
significant issues in mixed-motive cases has spawned substantial
conflicting interpretations in the lower courts.
The conflict and confusion in the courts over a significant number of
substantive and procedural issues in the mixed-motive employment
discrimination cases is, perhaps, symptomatic of a larger problem:
either the inability, or the refusal, of a significant number of federal
judges, including Supreme Court Justices, to recognize the continuing
significance that consideration of race and sex, for example, plays in the
decisionmaking process our society. The rejection of the concept of
societal discrimination, which substantially undergirds Justice O'Connor's rationale for a direct evidence standard in Price Waterhouse,
reflects the kind of attitude that substantially informed Congress's
decision to enact Title VII in the first instance. The legislative history
of the 1972 amendments to Title VII states,
During the preparation and presentation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as

96. In the congressional findings, Congress stated that "additional remedies under
Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace"; that "legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment"; and that one case in particular, Wards Cove, had
"weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections." Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1992).
97. For a review of the Court's 1988 Term employment discrimination cases, see Mark
S. Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Employment Discrimination
Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1989).
98. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 45, at 36.

The inevitable effect of the Price Waterhouse decision is to permit prohibited
employment discrimination to escape sanction under Title VII....
The impact of the decision is particularly profound because the factual situation
at issue in Price Waterhouse is a common one. ...
If Title VII's ban on discrimination in employment is to be meaningful, victims
of proven discrimination must be able to obtain relief, and perpetrators of
discrimination must be held liable for their actions.
H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 46-47 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 584-85.
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a series of isolated and distinguishable events, due, for the most part,
to ill-will on the part of some identifiable individual or organization.... Experience, however, has shown this to be an oversimplified
expectation, incorrect in its conclusions.
Employment discrimination, as we know today, is a far more
complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject
generally describe the problem in terms of "systems" and "effects"
rather than simply intentional wrongs. The literature on the subject
is replete with discussions of the mechanics of seniority and lines of
progression, perpetuation of the present effects of earlier discriminatory practices through various institutional devices, and testing and
validation requirements. 99
Both the Supreme Court's approach to mixed-motive cases and the
limitations on relief that courts have endorsed, as in Stevens, 100 are not
likely to hasten the time when employment discrimination is substantially a phenomenon of the past.

99. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2143-44.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 71-84.
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